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Abstract
Despite their best efforts, scientists may be unable to construct
models that simultaneously exemplify every theoretical virtue. One
explanation for this is the existence of tradeoffs: relationships of at-
tenuation that constrain the extent to which models can have such de-
sirable qualities. In this paper, we characterize three types of tradeoffs
theorists may confront. These characterizations are then used to ex-
amine the relationships between parameter precision and several types
of generality. We show that several of these relationships exhibit trade-
offs and discuss what consequences those tradeoffs have for theoretical
practice, especially in sciences that study complex phenomena.
1 Introduction
Much of the theoretical research in evolutionary biology, ecology, and other
sciences studying complex systems proceeds via the study of mathemati-
cal models. For any given phenomenon of interest, one often finds myriad
models differing in scope, generality, precision, accuracy, and the number
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of included causal factors in the literature. Theorists often motivate this
proliferation of models by pointing to the tradeoffs they face; they claim,
for example, that they cannot maximize precision and generality, so some
models are more precise and some more general.
Richard Levins argued that such tradeoffs require theorists to adopt
different strategies of model building depending on their theoretical goals.
(1966) His own discussion argued that a three-way tradeoff exists between
generality, realism, and precision, such that a model builder cannot simul-
taneously maximize all of these desiderata. Recent philosophical literature
has raised doubts regarding Levins’ three-way tradeoff (Weisberg, 2006) and
has even questioned the existence of tradeoffs in general (Orzack & Sober,
1993; Orzack, 2005). However, the bulk of the new literature on this topic
argues that at least some tradeoffs are real, be they psychological, pragmatic
(Odenbaugh, 2003), or the result of the logic of representation (Weisberg,
2004).
In this paper, we reexamine the concept of tradeoffs discussed by Levins,
by biologists working in Levins’ tradition, and by philosophers of science.
We argue that there is not one, but at least three relevant types of tradeoff.
After giving definitions for these, we investigate their interrelationships and
consider the circumstances under which one type of tradeoff implies another.
Finally, the paper revisits the relationship between generality and precision,
two desiderata that have previously been alleged to exhibit a tradeoff. With
our new taxonomy of tradeoffs, we show that precision and generality do in
fact trade off, and that the relationship between these modeling attributes
is more restrictive than was previously argued.
2 Tradeoffs
Tradeoffs are relationships of attenuation that hold between two or more
modeling attributes, or what Levins (1966) called desiderata of model build-
ing. Attenuation occurs when an increase in the magnitude of one attribute
makes the achievement of another more difficult. In this paper, we will con-
fine ourselves to discussions of two-way attenuation. Attenuation comes in
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at least four varieties, only three of which are actually tradeoffs and hence
of greatest concern to us in this article.
The first kind of attenuation is simple attenuation. Two attributes ex-
hibit simple attenuation if and only if increasing the magnitude of one
modeling attribute makes it more difficult but not impossible to increase
the magnitude of another attribute. Simple attenuation imposes impor-
tant pragmatic constraints on modelers, as the resources required to deal
with the attenuation may be considerable. However, there are also forms
of attenuation that cannot be overcome through further data collection or
other resources. Specifically, we identify and define three such types: strict
tradeoffs, increase tradeoffs, and Levins tradeoffs.
2.1 Strict Tradeoffs
We begin with a procedural definition for strict tradeoffs. Two desiderata
exhibit a strict tradeoff (s-tradeoff) when an increase in the magnitude of
one desideratum necessarily results in a decrease in the magnitude of the
second, and vice versa. In other words, as the magnitude of one of the
desiderata goes up, the other must come down.
In order to formalize this concept, we will define the tradeoffs in terms of
the set of possible values the modeling attributes can take when the tradeoff
applies. To do this, we begin by defining a set Λ, which contains ordered
tuples corresponding to the possible magnitudes that different attributes
can take in a single model. Because we will only be considering pairwise
relationships between modeling attributes, we will designate Λ to be the
set of possible simultaneous values for two modeling attributes P and Q.
Thus Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each ordered pair 〈pi, qi〉 is a pair of allowable
simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q.
When no tradeoff obtains between P and Q, then Λ will correspond to
the cartesian product of the possible magnitudes of P and Q. But when a
tradeoff obtains, only specific pairs will be included in Λ. In the case of a
strict tradeoff, the only ordered pairs allowed in Λ are those that satisfy the
following constraint: for every set of ordered pairs, if P in the first pair is
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smaller than P in the second pair, then Q in the first pair must be larger
than Q in the second pair.
Since we will need to refer to elements of Λ, we adopt the notation that
pi and ρ are arbitrary elements of Λ, each designating a different pair of
values that can be associated with a particular model. (pi)1 designates the
first element in ordered pair pi, and (pi)2 designates the second. For example,
if we are considering the magnitudes for precision and generality that are
associated with a model, pi denotes a particular possible precision/generality
pair for that model, and (pi)1 denotes the precision of the model as expressed
by the pair and (pi)2 the generality. The symbols < and > indicate an
ordering over these elements in the standard way. If we wish to compare
the precision designated by two possible pairs where the value given for
precision in one is greater than in the other, this may therefore be symbolized
(pi)1 < (ρ)1. Using this notation, we can give the following definition for a
strict tradeoff.
Definition 1. Let Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each 〈pi, qi〉 corresponds to a pair of
possible simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q. Let pi and ρ be two distinct
elements of Λ. A strict tradeoff obtains between P and Q iff ∀pi∀ρ[(pi)1 <
(ρ)1 ↔ (pi)2 > (ρ)2]
This definition can be applied to a wide range of modeling attributes, be-
cause the attributes in question need not share any scale or continuity prop-
erties. It is only required that the two attributes can be expressed as ordered
pairs of simultaneously achievable magnitudes. While the definition gener-
alizes beyond easily graphable cases, it is useful to represent the tradeoff
graphically as we have in Figure 1.
Although the definition is stated in terms of (pi)1 having smaller magni-
tude than (ρ)1, it is fully symmetric because the quantifiers on pi and ρ both
range over each ordered pair. Thus, the definition entails that when the
magnitude of one of these two attributes goes down, the magnitude of the
other must go up. This symmetry is important because, if it were allowable
to decrease one magnitude without a corresponding increase in the other,





Figure 1: Diagram of a strict tradeoff representing the possible magnitudes
allowed for attributes P and Q as a dashed line. pi and ρ are two arbitrary
points, which are elements of Λ. Along with all of the other allowable points,
they satisfy the definition of a strict tradeoff. The negative slope of this line
is a signature of strict tradeoffs, although the definition also applies to cases
where a slope is not well-defined.
of that attribute without an associated decrease in the other. This is of
course precisely what is prohibited according to our informal definition of
the s-tradeoff.
The definition also stipulates that Λ contains at least two distinct el-
ements to avoid cases where the biconditional is trivially satisfied. These
cases are excluded because tradeoffs are only of scientific interest when they
occur due to the interaction of modeling attributes.
2.2 Increase Tradeoffs
The second kind of tradeoff is an increase tradeoff, or i-tradeoff. Informally,
two modeling attributes exhibit an i-tradeoff when the magnitude of the
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attributes cannot both be increased simultaneously. That is, an increase in
the magnitude of one cannot be accompanied by an increase in the other. In
order to formalise this definition we will once again invoke a set of ordered
pairs Λ, defined as above.
Definition 2. Let Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each 〈pi, qi〉 corresponds to a pair
of possible simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q. Let pi and ρ be two dis-
tinct elements of Λ. An increase tradeoff obtains between P and Q iff
∀pi∀ρ[((pi)1 < (ρ)1 → (pi)2 ≥ (ρ)2)&((pi)2 < (ρ)2 → (pi)1 ≥ (ρ)1)]
The difference between the i-tradeoff and the s-tradeoff is that in the
i-tradeoff case there can be subsets of Λ where the magnitude of one of the
modeling attributes increases as we move between elements, but the magni-
tude of the second stays the same. This represents a significant constraint
on a modeler, but one less stringent than the s-tradeoff. This definition also
stipulates that one cannot decrease both attributes in the presence of an
i-tradeoff. Figure 2 illustrates a situation that exhibits an i-tradeoff but not
an s-tradeoff.
2.3 Levins Tradeoffs
Two attributes exhibit a Levins tradeoff (L-tradeoff) when the magnitude of
both of these attributes cannot be simultaneously maximized. If we look in
Λ for the maximum value of P (pmax) and the maximum value of Q (qmax),
then when an L-tradeoff obtains, there is no ordered pair 〈pmax, qmax〉 in Λ.
Definition 3. Let Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each 〈pi, qi〉 corresponds to a pair
of possible simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q. Let pi be an element of
Λ. Further, let pmax be the maximum value for P in Λ and qmax be the
maximum value for Q in Λ. A Levins tradeoff obtains between P and Q iff
¬∃pi[((pi)1 = pmax)&((pi)2 = qmax)]
We call this a ‘Levins tradeoff’ because it is closest to the concept of a
tradeoff discussed in Levins’ philosophical work (Weisberg, 2006). Levins





Figure 2: Diagram of an increase tradeoff representing the possible magni-
tudes allowed for attributes P and Q (i.e. the points in Λ) as a dashed line.
pi and ρ are arbitrary points in Λ that satisfy the definition of an i-tradeoff.
The graphical signature of increase tradeoffs is a non-positive slope, although







Figure 3: Illustration of a Levins tradeoff between two attributes. pi lies on
the horizon of the tradeoff, illustrated by the dashed line. In this particular
case, there is a region of positive value about the simultaneous in-principle
maxima that the model attributes cannot reach, designated by the shaded
area. Apart from this limitation, the attributes of the model can take any
combination of magnitudes.
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have a maximum magnitude in Λ, otherwise a Levins tradeoff vacuously
obtains.
Whenever an L-tradeoff holds between two attributes, there exists a set
of possible combined values that the attributes cannot exceed, which we call
the horizon. We use the term ‘horizon’ to differentiate this in-practice limit
from the in-principle maxima the attributes could simultaneously attain if
the L-tradeoff did not hold. Considered graphically, the horizon defines
the upper limit above which the magnitudes of the two attributes cannot
simultaneously extend (see Figure 3).
The inability to simultaneously maximize two modeling desiderata means
that if a modeler wishes to maximize the magnitude of one desideratum,
she must accept that the magnitude of the other will be suboptimal. The
upshot of this is that when faced with an L-tradeoff, the modeler must make
strategic decisions regarding which attribute to maximize. A model that is
constructed under such constraints will therefore be determined at least in
part by the goals of the modeler in question.
Similarly, and perhaps more acutely, the existence of s-tradeoffs and
i-tradeoffs will strongly influence decisions regarding what kind of model
will be best for the job at hand, possibly eliminating the utility of some
models outright. For example, if an s-tradeoff makes maximization of either
attribute too costly in terms of the other, it may be that for the model to
be of any use, neither attribute can be maximized. In Section 5, we argue
that an s-tradeoff obtains between one kind of generality and precision. Since
precision and generality are often both important in scientific practice, it will
often be the case that any useful model will have intermediate magnitudes
for both of these desiderata.
3 Relationships Between the Tradeoffs
We have now given formal definitions for the three kinds of tradeoffs. The
interrelationships between the tradeoffs are relatively complex, but there are
some clear entailments among them. In this section, we will argue that the
existence of an s-tradeoff entails that an i-tradeoff and an L-tradeoff occur,
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and that when a weak condition is met, the existence of an i-tradeoff entails
that an L-tradeoff occurs.
3.1 Strict Tradeoffs
The existence of an s-tradeoff between two attributes entails an i-tradeoff
between those attributes. This follows trivially from the formal definitions
of i- and s-tradeoffs. Since ≤ is equivalent to (< or =), A < B entails
that A ≤ B. As the definition for an increase tradeoff is identical to the
definition for a strict tradeoff with ≤ instead of < in the consequent of each
conditional, any instance that satisfies the criteria for a strict tradeoff will
also satisfy the criteria for an increase tradeoff.
The case can be made intuitively as follows: The existence of a strict
tradeoff means that as we increase the magnitude of A, we must decrease
the magnitude of B. If we must decrease the magnitude of one attribute
whenever we increase the magnitude of the other, we cannot increase the
magnitude of both attributes. Therefore an increase tradeoff will also hold.
When an s-tradeoff holds between two attributes, then an L-tradeoff will
also hold between those attributes. The idea is intuitive, but the justification
of this entailment is more complex, so we give a formal proof below. Note
that the entailment only goes through due to the specification that an s-
tradeoff requires two distinct elements, otherwise if Λ contained only a single
element 〈pmax, qmax〉, this would trivially exhibit an s-tradeoff but would not
exhibit an L-tradeoff.
Theorem 1. The existence of an s-tradeoff between two attributes entails
an L-tradeoff between those attributes
Proof. Let Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each 〈pi, qi〉 corresponds to a pair of possible
simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q. Let pmax be the maximum value for
P in Λ and qmax be the maximum value for Q in Λ.
Assume that P andQ exhibit an s-tradeoff. This means that ∀pi∀ρ[(pi)1 <
(ρ)1 ↔ (pi)2 > (ρ)2] Assume that an L-tradeoff does not obtain. This means
that 〈pmax, qmax〉 is an element of Λ. Let X designate this element. Therefore
(X)1 = pmax and (X)2 = qmax.
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For a strict tradeoff to hold, there must be at least two distinct elements
in Λ. Let Y designate an arbitrary element of Λ that is distinct from X.
We can instantiate the universal quantifiers in the definition of an s-tradeoff
using the elements X and Y , first instantiating X for pi and Y for ρ, then
Y for pi and X for ρ, to give us the formulae: [(X)1 < (Y )1 ↔ (X)2 > (Y )2]
and [(Y )1 < (X)1 ↔ (Y )2 > (X)2]
Subtheorem 1. (X)1 = (Y )1
Proof. [(Y )1 < (X)1 ↔ (Y )2 > (X)2] can be satisfied if either both (Y )1 <
(X)1 and (Y )2 > (X)2 are true, or if they are both false. It is clear that
they cannot be both true, as we know that (X)2 = qmax, and therefore it is
impossible for (Y )2 > (X)2 to be true.
For both to be false, it must be the case that (Y )1 < (X)1 is false, so
either (Y )1 > (X)1 or (Y )1 = (X)1 must be true.
Since (X)1 = pmax it must be that (X)1 = (Y )1
Subtheorem 2. (X)2 = (Y )2
Proof. If we follow the same reasoning as for the case above, but applied to
the [(X)1 < (Y )1 ↔ (X)2 > (Y )2] instantiation, then we see it must be that
(X)2 = (Y )2
X and Y are distinct elements of Λ, and therefore cannot have exactly
the same values for both members in the ordered pair. But we have proved
that for an s-tradeoff to occur in the absence of an L-tradeoff, it must be that
both (X)1 = (Y )1 and (X)2 = (Y )2, which results in a contradiction. Thus,
if an s-tradeoff holds between two attributes, this entails that an L-tradeoff
also holds between those attributes.
3.2 Increase Tradeoffs
We have seen that whenever an s-tradeoff holds between two attributes,
this entails that an i-tradeoff and an L-tradeoff also hold between those at-
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tributes. Since i-tradeoffs are strictly weaker than s-tradeoffs, the existence
of an i-tradeoff does not entail an s-tradeoff. However, it can be shown
that the existence of an i-tradeoff entails an L-tradeoff as long as there is
at least one member in Λ where neither attribute is maximal. If we know
that an i-tradeoff holds between two attributes and this weak condition is
met, no member in Λ can have both attributes at maximum, and therefore
an L-tradeoff will hold between those attributes.
Theorem 2. The existence of an i-tradeoff and any element with submaxi-
mal values for both attributes entails an L-tradeoff
Proof. Let Λ = {〈pi, qi〉}, where each 〈pi, qi〉 corresponds to a pair of possible
simultaneous magnitudes for P and Q. Let pmax be the maximum value for
P in Λ and qmax be the maximum value for Q in Λ. Assume that P and Q
exhibit an i-tradeoff. Applying our definition, we know that ∀pi∀ρ[((pi)1 <
(ρ)1 → (pi)2 ≥ (ρ)2)&((pi)2 < (ρ)2 → (pi)1 ≥ (ρ)1)].
Assume that one element in Λ has sub-maximal values for both P and Q.
Let Y designate this element. In that case, (Y )1 < pmax and (Y )2 < qmax.
Now assume that P and Q do not exhibit an L-tradeoff. This means that
〈pmax, qmax〉 is also an element of Λ. Let X designate this element. In that
case, (X)1 = pmax and (X)2 = qmax. We can instantiate our definition of
an i-tradeoff with [(Y )1 < (X)1 → (Y )2 ≥ (X)2]&[(Y )2 < (X)2 → (Y )1 ≥
(X)1]
Because both attributes are submaximal in Y , (Y )1 < (X)1. According
to our definition, this means that (Y )2 ≥ (X)2, which is impossible since
(X)2 = pmax and (Y )2 is submaximal. This is a contradiction.
Therefore the existence of an i-tradeoff between two attributes plus the
existence of at least one element in Λ that has submaximal values for both




In some cases, the existence of an L-tradeoff and the restriction of Λ to cer-
tain sets of values may entail other tradeoffs. For example, if the magnitudes
of two attributes of a given model lie on the horizon of an L-tradeoff, this
will lead to a “partial” increase tradeoff, as it is impossible to increase both
magnitudes from any point on the horizon. However, we do not believe that
any other form of attenuation is entailed by the existence of an L-tradeoff
without such further limitations.
Regardless of this, the existence of an L-tradeoff in and of itself can
shape and constrain scientific practice in significant ways. In particular, the
existence of an L-tradeoff means that it is impossible for a single model to
maximize every desirable attribute. It was in this spirit that Levins argued
from the existence of tradeoffs to a particular strategy of model building.
He claimed that if no single model can be optimal in all respects, theorists
ought to construct multiple models, each of which sacrifices one desideratum
in order to maximize others. These individually restricted models can then
be compared and integrated in an attempt to meet our competing modeling
goals.
While we doubt that Levins tradeoffs arise for logical and representa-
tional reasons in the absence of s- and i-tradeoffs, we believe that scientists
confront them on a regular basis. In such cases, the L-tradeoffs are domain-
specific and depend on empirical facts, not logic.
Particularly striking examples of L-tradeoffs can be found in the uncer-
tainty principles of both classical and quantum mechanical wave mechanics.
In quantum mechanics, for example, there is an L-tradeoff between the spec-
ification of a particle’s position and its momentum. At a fine enough grain of
resolution, it becomes impossible to maximize the precision of both of these
quantities. In fact, the L-tradeoff can be specified precisely as ∆x∆px ≥ 12 h¯.
This constraint means that any model which requires the specification of po-
sition and momentum, such as the ones developed to account for chemical
phenomena like reaction rates, cannot maximize the precision of specifica-
tion for both of these quantities (Levine, 1991).
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This L-tradeoff between the specification of position and momentum has
nothing to do with the logic of representation, but rather the fact that po-
sition and momentum are described by particular hermitian operators and
that these operators do not commute. The fact that position and momen-
tum are accurately described by these operators in quantum mechanics was
an empirical discovery. Had the world been different and these quantities
were described by commuting operators, then they would be simultaneously
knowable with maximal accuracy. This is thus an example of a logically
contingent L-tradeoff.
3.4 Summary of the tradeoffs and their interactions
A strict tradeoff obtains between two modeling attributes when it is impos-
sible to increase the magnitude of one without a decrease in the magnitude
of the other, and it is impossible to decrease one without an increase in the
other. We have shown that if an s-tradeoff holds between two attributes, this
entails that an i-tradeoff and L-tradeoff also hold between those attributes.
An i-tradeoff obtains between two attributes when it is impossible to in-
crease the magnitudes of both attributes and it is impossible to decrease the
magnitudes of both attributes. If an i-tradeoff holds between two attributes,
and at least one pair of these attributes has neither at maximum value, then
an L-tradeoff also holds between those attributes. An L-tradeoff holds be-
tween two attributes when it is impossible to simultaneously maximize both
attributes.
4 Precision and Generality
Having looked in detail at the three kinds of tradeoffs and some of the
relationships between them, we now analyze the relationships that obtain
between precision and generality. We have chosen to focus on these desider-
ata for this paper because of their role in earlier discussions of tradeoffs and
because of the connections they have to some of the larger goals of theoret-
ical practice, such as wide descriptive breadth, the discovery of similarities
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across disparate systems, and increased explanatory power. We will return
to these connections in further detail at the end of the paper. In this section,
we focus only on the tradeoffs between these desiderata.
Earlier analyses have argued for the existence of tradeoffs between pre-
cision and different forms of generality (Levins, 1966, 1968; Weisberg, 2004,
2006). We agree that there are tradeoffs between these desiderata, but will
show that the attenuation is more stringent than was previously believed.
To do this, we begin by clarifying how the relevant terms are defined.
4.1 Precision
When discussed in the context of mathematical modeling, precision is often
characterized as parameter precision, an attribute of the equations that de-
scribe mathematical models. Unlike the statistical notion of precision, which
is an attribute of data, parameter precision is a measure of the fineness of
specification of parameter values.
Defining precision for an entire mathematical model description requires
an assessment of the precision of each of the individual parameters in that
description. We can do this by first defining the uncertainty associated with
some parameter value as the deviation of that value from the best estimate
of the true value.
Canonically, a parameter value might be written as the central value for
the parameter plus or minus the uncertainty associated with it. The central
value is often interpreted as a best guess or best estimate, so we can write
the canonical value of an imprecisely defined parameter value as pbest ± δp,
where δp is the uncertainty.
Precision can then be defined in terms of uncertainty as follows:
Definition 4. If a parameter p has value pbest ± δp, then that parameter’s
precision is 1/2δp.
Precision is defined as the reciprocal of two times the uncertainty to preserve
the intuitive idea that precision increases as uncertainty decreases.
It becomes a more complex issue to define precision when dealing with
multiple parameters. Probably the best general way to aggregate parameter
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precision is with the use of an n-dimensional distance formula. Because these
details are not necessary for the discussion in this article, we will rely on the
following comparative test of precision applicable to the cases discussed in
this paper:
A model description D1 is more precise than a model descrip-
tion D2 if D1 picks out a proper subset of the models picked out
by D2, when all other factors are held fixed.
This test relies on the fact that when we compare two equations with dif-
ferent degrees of precision, the more precise one will describe a subset of
the models described by the less precise one. This method only works when
comparing equations that have the same number of parameters and obey the
nesting relations discussed below. Most measures of parameter precision will
be unable to judge which description is more precise if these conditions do
not hold.
To illustrate these ideas, we can consider the family of models of exponen-
tial population growth. An uninstantiated model description, or equation,




In this equation the variable N stands for population size, and r stands for
the growth rate of the population, which is assumed to be constant in the
models designated by this description.
This equation can be instantiated with differently specified values for r,
picking out different sets of models. For example, r might be instantiated
to give the descriptions:
dN
dt
= (1.5± 0.1)N (2)
dN
dt
= (1.50± 0.01)N (3)
Changes in precision will effect the set of models picked out by a descrip-
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tion. More precise descriptions will pick out subsets of the sets of models
picked out by less precise descriptions. This is easiest to show in cases such
as (2) and (3) above, where the parameter values in the different descrip-
tions overlap. Description (2) picks out all of the models that have a value
for r between 1.4 and 1.6, while description (3) only picks out the models
with a value for r between 1.49 and 1.51. Note that all of the models picked
out by description (3) are also picked out by description (2), but not vice
versa. This means that the set of models picked out by description (3) forms
a proper subset of the models picked out by description (2).
4.2 Fidelity and Model-world relations
The next modeling attribute we will discuss is generality. At first pass, this
may seem straightforward: Generality is a measure of how many phenomena
a model or set of models successfully relate to. However, the manner in
which models relate to their targets is not a simple or uncontroversial issue.
Before we proceed, we need to be clear regarding how we view the model-
world relationship in this context.
One position regarding this relationship is that, ideally, a relationship of
isomorphism should hold between a model and a mathematical representa-
tion of its target (van Fraassen, 1980). Another possibility is that the rela-
tionship is less stringent but still model-theoretic, such as homomorphism
(Lloyd, 1994) or partial isomorphism (da Costa & French, 2003). Other
possibilities include metric relationships, such as distance in a state space
between model and target, as well as less formal notions of similarity, such
as the ones offered by Cartwright (1983), Giere (1988), and Godfrey-Smith
(2006). Pluralism about these matters is, of course, also possible (Downes,
1992).
While our own view on these matters is probably closest to the pluralism
advocated by Downes, we believe that what follows is compatible with all
of these ideas, except perhaps the most stringent reading of the demand
for isomorphism. Rather than taking sides in this debate, we will use the
term ‘applies to’ when describing the relationship between model and target
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phenomenon. We do this to emphasize something that is not a typical focus
in the literature. What we want to highlight are the standards a modeler
brings to bear when determining whether the model applies to a target. In
other words, not only is it important to assess the fidelity of a particular
model, which might be assessed with model-theoretic, metric, or informal
similarity measures, it is also important to understand the standards of
fidelity applied by the modeler. We call these standards fidelity criteria.
There are many ways in which scientists may employ models, and a
modeler’s fidelity criteria will vary according to the task at hand. Any par-
ticular model may be of use to different investigators in different ways and
for different reasons, according to which aspects of the target and model
concern them. For example, two theorists may have different demands for
how predictively accurate a model is: one might require near-exact results,
while another might be satisfied if the model only approximately predicts the
behavior of the target. Alternatively, another theorist might be solely con-
cerned with modeling the causal dependencies within the target, and have
very limited requirements regarding fidelity in terms of predictive accuracy.
From this, we see that modelers may be concerned with the outcome
of the model: its predictions about the quantities of measurable attributes.
We call this the dynamical fidelity of the model and the theorists’ standards
for dynamical fidelity are the dynamical fidelity criteria. Alternatively or
additionally, a theorist might be interested in how well a model describes
the causal structure of the target system. The assessment of this attribute
is the representational fidelity of the model and the criteria for assessing it
are the representational fidelity criteria. (Weisberg, 2007)
For example, meteorologists require high dynamical fidelity from their
models, because they need to make precise and accurate predictions of the
weather. However, because the goal is to predict rather than explain, mete-
orologists may not require high representational fidelity from these models.
Conversely, theorists constructing macroevolutionary models often aim for
high representational fidelity, even if they cannot predict observables with
quantitative accuracy. Models with biomedical applications may require
high degrees of both kinds of fidelity so that effective medical interventions
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can be planned. Usually, a model will require a complex mixture of these
two types of fidelity.
The fidelity criteria in use in any modeling situation will have a notable
effect on the generality of the models under consideration. All else being
equal, more permissive fidelity criteria will tend to mean that a given model
will apply to more phenomena. For this reason, in our analyses of the
interaction between precision and generality we will assume that the fidelity
criteria used to assess the relationship between models and target are held
fixed. In section 5.3, we will revisit how changing fidelity criteria can affect
the tradeoffs.
4.3 Generality
Unlike precision, which is an attribute of the equations we use to describe
models, the concept of generality we are interested in concerns the model-
target relationship. In what follows, we take generality to be a measure
of how many targets the models in question apply to.1 Having made this
clarification, there are two further ways in which the concept of generality
must be disambiguated.
First we need to differentiate between generality regarding the number
of target systems an individual model applies to, and regarding the number
of target systems a set or family of models applies to. In the first instance, if
model m1 applies to more targets than model m2, then m1 is more general
than m2. In the second, if the set of models M1 as a whole applies to more
targets than the set of models M2, then set M1 is more general than set M2.
These two types of generality can co-vary; increasing the generality of
the individual models in a given set will often also increase the generality
of the set as a whole. However, individual model generality and model set
generality can also come apart. For example, we will show that it is possible
to increase model set generality while holding individual model generality
fixed. The fact that individual and set generality can come apart means that
1Note that we do not use ‘generality’ to refer to the inclusiveness of causal factors in
the model. As we discuss in section 5.3, we use the term ‘scope’ to refer to this property.
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they must be analyzed separately when we consider whether they tradeoff
against other modeling attributes.
Generality must also be disambiguated according to the type of target
systems considered. It must be clear whether we are concerned with how
many actual targets a model or set of models applies to, or how many possible
targets the model or set applies to.2 We call these different types of general-
ity a-generality and p-generality respectively. P-generality is not something
that only philosophers might take seriously; it is often what scientists have
in mind when they discuss how general a model is, especially in the context
of its explanatory power. Sometimes exploration of the non-actual helps ex-
plain the actual, and the point of some explanatory models is not necessarily
to resemble any real systems, but to canvass possibility space. For example,
biological models that generalize to show that the fitness costs for a species
to have three sexes are too high can explain why there are no such species
in the real world (Fisher, 1930).
P- and a-generality will usually take different values for any given model
or set of models; the number of actual targets applied to will be different from
the number of possible targets applied to except in some extremely limited
circumstances. Additionally, two models might be identically p-general but
differ in their a-generality and vice versa. Once again, this means that these
different types of generality will have different relations to other modeling
attributes, and will therefore need to be considered separately in an analysis
of tradeoffs.
As we sometimes measure generality in terms of logical possibility, we
will be dealing with infinite sets of possible targets. This means that we
cannot always order the generality of models or sets of models according
to cardinality, but will have to consider whether they apply to some set
of target systems that is a proper subset of another, thus being of lesser
generality. This is a less universal measure than we might like, since it
2We will interpret ‘possible targets’ to mean logically possible targets. One might
also use the term to pick out nomologically or physically possible targets. We prefer
the broader, logical interpretation because the interests of modelers range from what is
known to be actual through what is known to be physically impossible. Future analyses
of tradeoffs might fruitfully explore more restricted modalities.
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restricts us to cases where we are comparing sets that stand in set/subset
relations to each other, but to date this is most comprehensive way we know
of to analyze p-generality.
Since individual model and model set generality can take the p- and a-
form, we have four types of generality and hence four interactions to analyze.
Each will be considered in turn in the following section.
5 Tradeoffs Between Precision & Generality
We now have the tools in place to assess the relationship between precision
and generality in the context of modeling. As stated above, we begin our
analysis by isolating precision and generality, holding everything including
the fidelity criteria fixed. After this analysis, we will consider what occurs
when the fidelity criteria are allowed to vary, arguing that this can affect
the generality of a model or set of models, which can in turn modify what
results from the tradeoff.
5.1 Precision and P-generality
First we consider how an increase in precision affects individual model p-
generality. Recall that precision is an attribute of model descriptions, not
of models themselves. Alterations in precision modify the number of models
picked out by a description, but not how these models apply to their targets.
As all other features such as fidelity criteria are held fixed, this means that
the number of logically possible targets any given individual model will apply
to is unchanged. Individual model p-generality is therefore unaffected when
precision is manipulated.
However, as noted previously, a more precise model description picks
out a proper subset of the models picked out by a less precise counterpart.
Since each individual model applies to a fixed number of logically possible
targets, the set of logically possible targets applied to by a subset of models
is also a subset compared to the targets applied to in the less precise case.
This means that model set p-generality is decreased whenever precision is
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increased.
We can consider this argument in detail:
1. Assume model description d picks out a set of models M1.
2. If model description d′ is more precise than d, d′ will pick out M2, a
set of models that is a proper subset of M1.
3. Since all attributes other than precision are held fixed, each individ-
ual model applies to the same number of possible target systems as
previously.
4. This means that, since M2 is a proper subset of M1, the models in
M2 apply to a proper subset of the logically possible target systems
applied to by M1.
5. Therefore, by definition, M2 is less p-general than M1.
6. Therefore, increasing the precision of a model description means that
model set p-generality is reduced.
The preceding argument shows that any increase in precision will impose
a cost on p-generality. However, recall that two attributes only exhibit a
strict tradeoff when an increase in either attribute results in a decrease in the
other. Therefore in order to assess whether precision and p-generality exhibit
a strict tradeoff, we must check to see if the attenuation is symmetrical. We
can do this with the reverse argument:
1. Assume model description d picks out a set of models M1 and model
description d′ picks out a set of models M2
2. If M2 is more p-general than M1, M2 must apply to a superset of the
possible targets M1 applies to.
3. Since all attributes other than precision are held fixed, each individ-
ual model applies to the same number of possible target systems as
previously.
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4. This means that, since the models in M2 apply to a superset of the
logically possible target systems in M1, it must also be the case that
M2 is a superset of M1.
5. Therefore d′ is less precise than d.
6. Therefore, increasing the p-generality of a set of models means that
the precision of the model description is reduced.
If all other attributes are held fixed, the only way we can increase p-generality
is to decrease precision. Since we have shown that an increase in either preci-
sion or generality imposes a cost on the other, the relation between precision
and model set p-generality is a strict tradeoff.
5.2 Precision and A-generality
Next we turn to the relationship between precision and a-generality. This is
more complex than the p-generality case, since the effect that an alteration
in precision has on a-generality will at least in part be determined by the
empirical features of the particular system under consideration. We have
seen that an increase in precision entails a decrease in p-generality. However,
the actual targets that a model applies to will nearly always be far fewer
than the logically possible targets the model applies to, so a reduction in p-
generality does not necessarily imply a reduction in a-generality. This means
that an increase in precision will only sometimes come at the expense of a-
generality, dependent on the systems modeled and the attributes of those
targets that are of interest to the modeler.
This is particularly clear when we consider the difference between how
changes in precision affect the a-generality of models used in disciplines
whose typical targets are homogenous with respect to the properties of in-
terest, and those whose targets are heterogeneous. In both the homogeneous
and heterogeneous cases, increases in precision may or may not lead to the
exclusion of any actual targets. However, there will be a limit to how pre-
cise a model description can be before any actual targets are necessarily
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excluded. The more homogeneous the target systems of interest, the more
precise the description can be before this limit is reached.
For example, the targets and attributes that ecological models are di-
rected towards are often very heterogeneous. The intrinsic growth rate, the
attribute corresponding to r in our population growth model description,
can be extremely varied from population to population. Consider the differ-
ence between the growth rate in a population of cane toads (Bufo marinus)
in Australia and in the Americas. In Australia, cane toads have multiplied
so rapidly as to constitute an ecological disaster, while in their native habi-
tats they are largely static in numbers. Cases such as these mean that a
model description that contains a finely specified value for r will often pick
out a set of models that only applies to a small proportion of the relevant
target populations. Precisely specified values of r will correspond to models
appropriate only for studying the dynamics of either Australian cane toads
or American cane toads, but not cane toads in general.
On the other hand, models in the physical sciences are often directed to-
wards homogeneous sets of targets. This allows for the possibility of writing
down highly precise model descriptions, which pick out a relatively small set
of models, and yet still apply to all of the target systems of interest. For
example, a model description describing models of electron mass and charge
can be extremely precise, yet still pick out a set of models that applies to all
electrons. This possibility results from the fact that physical quantities such
as the mass and charge of fundamental particles are extremely homogeneous.
In terms of these attributes, at least, there are no differences between the
electrons in any part of the world, or for that matter the electrons on Alpha
Centuri and those on Earth.
Because the degree of homogeneity of the target systems alters the effect
that an increase in precision has on the a-generality of sets of models, the
exact relationship between these attributes will vary on a case-by-case basis
and requires specific empirical information about the targets being modeled.
That said, there are some general features we can point to regarding the
interaction between precision and a-generality.
Consider the relationship between precision and individual model a-
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generality. As in the the p-generality case, changes in precision have no
effect on individual model a-generality. Precision only determines whether
a given model is picked out by a given description, not how the models relate
to targets. So as long as we hold all other attributes fixed, any given model
that is picked out will apply to the same number of actual targets regardless
of changes in precision. Therefore changes in precision have no effect on
individual model a-generality.
A second general relationship concerns precision and model set a-generality.
Regardless of the system modeled, it is impossible to increase both precision
and a-generality if all other attributes are fixed. We know that an increase
in precision means that the set of models picked out by a description applies
to a subset of the logically possible targets compared to previously. As dis-
cussed above, whether this will reduce the number of actual targets applied
to depends on the systems themselves; however, we know a priori that there
is no way that the targets in the world could be arranged such that reducing
the size of our set of models while keeping all else fixed could increase the
number of actual targets to which our set of models applies. This means
that we cannot increase both precision and a-generality.
We can show this with a similar argument to that used above:
1. Assume model description d picks out a set of models M1.
2. If model description d′ is more precise than d, d′ will pick out M2, a
set of models that is a proper subset of M1.
3. Since all other attributes are held fixed, each individual model applies
to the same number of actual targets as previously, even if this is zero.
4. Therefore, as M2 is a proper subset of M1, M2 cannot apply to more
actual targets than M1.
5. Therefore by definition, M2 cannot be more a-general than M1.
6. Therefore, it is not possible to increase precision and also increase
model set a-generality.
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Again, in order to show that a tradeoff obtains between precision and
a-generality, we need to check that the relationship holds in both directions.
However, this time a simple reversal of the previous argument does not give
us a symmetrical outcome, as the attenuation from a-generality to precision
is stronger than from precision to a-generality.
1. Assume model description d picks out a set of models M1 and descrip-
tion d′ picks out M2.
2. If M2 is more a-general than M1, M2 must apply to more actual targets
than M1.
3. Since all other attributes are held fixed, each individual model applies
to the same number of actual targets as previously, even if this is zero.
4. This means that the only way that M2 can apply to more actual targets
than M1 is if M2 is a superset of M1
5. If M2 is a superset of M1, then d′ is less precise then d.
6. Therefore, increasing model set a-generality means that precision must
be decreased.
When we increase the precision of a model description, we cannot si-
multaneously increase a-generality, and if we increase a-generality, we must
decrease precision. This means that precision and a-generality do not ex-
hibit a strict tradeoff, as a necessary cost is incurred in only one direction.
However, because an increase in a-generality incurs a cost in precision, this
makes it impossible to increase a-generality and also increase precision. This
means that a simultaneous increase is impossible in both directions, and so
a-generality and precision exhibit an i-tradeoff.
We have now assessed the tradeoff relations between precision and the
four categories of generality. Precision and both types of individual model
generality show no tradeoffs. Precision and model set p-generality exhibit a
strict tradeoff, and precision and model set a-generality exhibit an increase
tradeoff.
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5.3 The Role of Scope and Fidelity Criteria
Precision and model set a-generality always exhibit an i-tradeoff, but the
case of the cane toads given above illustrates that when a high degree of
heterogeneity among targets is present, the attenuation is often stronger.
Here we will show that in addition to the intrinsic degree of heterogene-
ity between targets, changes in the evaluative standards adopted by the
modeler can also strengthen or weaken the tradeoff between precision and
a-generality. Very roughly, sets of models will apply to fewer cases when
one evaluates them with higher standards of fidelity or intends that they
capture more aspects of the target phenomena. These increased demands
concern the fidelity criteria and intended scope respectively.
Recall that fidelity criteria are the standards used to assess the degree of
similarity between model and target. These criteria are set by individuals
and communities of modelers. They may have very relaxed fidelity criteria
regarding a certain aspect of model and target, interested only in qualitative
aspects of that particular property. Alternatively, they may have demanding
fidelity criteria, and require that the model gives outputs that mimic the
target very closely. The choice of these criteria typically depends on how
the model will be used.
The intended scope of a model refers to which aspects of the target
the model is intended to capture. As noted in §4.3, we do not use ‘scope’
synonymously with generality. For us, the term refers not to the breadth
of applicability of the model, but rather to the aspects of a given target or
targets the theorist wants to capture with the model.
A modeler may be interested in modeling only a few aspects of her target
and disregard the others. In this case, her intended scope is very restricted.
Alternatively, a modeler may be inclusive regarding which properties of the
particular target she wishes to model, in which case the model will have a
broad intended scope.
For example, consider the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynam-
ics, which only takes predator and prey growth and death rates, rate of prey
capture by predators, and efficiency of predators at converting captures to
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new predator births into account. Typically, a biologist who employs this
model in her research intends the model to have limited scope. The model
is not intended to capture the effects of population structure, alternative
sources of food for the predators, the possibility of prey seeking cover, etc.3
However, she might widen the intended scope to include such factors, which
would require addition of the appropriate parameters. It is important to
note, therefore, that all things being equal, increasing the scope of a model
will tend to make one’s assessment of the model-target relationship more
demanding: There are more ways in which the model will be tested against
its target.
Returning now to the tradeoff between precision and a-generality, we can
ask how changes in scope and fidelity might affect this tradeoff in particular
cases. We begin by considering changes in intended scope. Our original
contention was that when a set of target systems is highly heterogeneous,
all things being equal, the attenuation between precision and a-generality
will often be more costly. This effect can be weakened, however, if the
modeler chooses a restricted intended scope. By choosing a limited scope,
the modeler reduces the number of aspects of targets her models must apply
to. In so doing, she can limit the effective heterogeneity of the targets,
limiting the effects of increasing precision on a-generality.4
Consider the case of an ecologist modeling foraging behavior in a rain-
forest. If she attempts to capture the foraging behavior of all the species
in a particular region of a rainforest, it will be impossible to use precise
descriptions (which thereby pick out a limited number of models) without
imposing heavy costs in a-generality. This is because there is a great deal of
variation between the strategies of different species, making the properties
of interest very heterogeneous. However, if she is selective regarding which
properties of these complex targets she wants to model, disparate targets in
3Their presence might have an affect on the dynamical fidelity of the model, but this
is a separate issue.
4This is not an absolute rule, of course, because it depends on both the kinds of
heterogeneity in the targets and the particular scope restrictions employed by the modeler.
In many cases, however, the result of limiting scope is to make the targets effectively more
homogeneous.
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the ecosystem can look more similar and therefore can be captured with a
smaller set of models. For example, her scope might be restricted to the en-
ergetic aspects of the foraging. Since these factors rely on biochemistry and
the distribution of resources in the ecosystem, individual differences among
organisms will be considerably diminished.
Another dimension along which the effective heterogeneity of targets
can be adjusted is via the fidelity criteria. When these criteria are lowered,
small differences between targets become less relevant and, depending on the
degree of heterogeneity among the targets, can be made negligible. This can
result in each individual model becoming more a-general, and by extension,
sets of these models becoming more a-general. In this way, the effects of the
tradeoff between precision and model set a-generality can be modified due
to the interaction of fidelity criteria and generality.
In conclusion, precision and model set a-generality always exhibit an
i-tradeoff, but the disparity between the intended targets, combined with
considerations of scope and fidelity can make the attenuation relationship
between them more or less costly.
6 Tradeoffs in Scientific Modeling
Theorists face many methodological constraints, some of which will abate
with improvements in technology or greater available resources. However,
there are at least three constraints that will not dissipate with scientific
progress, specifically, the tradeoffs discussed in this paper. Modeling desider-
ata can exhibit strict or increase tradeoffs due to facts regarding logic and
representation alone, while Levins tradeoffs result from contingent empirical
facts in particular domains.
As an example of these tradeoffs, we have shown that there is an s-
tradeoff between precision and p-generality, and an i-tradeoff between pre-
cision and a-generality. Because of the entailments among the tradeoffs,
this also means that precision and p-generality exhibit an increase trade-
off and a Levins tradeoff. In addition, by virtue of the fact that precision
and a-generality exhibit an i-tradeoff, we know that whenever any model
29
description that is not maximally precise picks out a set of models that is
not maximally a-general, no description and set of models in this setting
can be maximally precise and maximally a-general.
We believe these results are significant for a number of reasons. First, a
rigorous demonstration of these tradeoffs answers an earlier demand in the
literature by Orzack and Sober (Orzack & Sober, 1993; Orzack, 2005) for
demonstrable proof of the existence of tradeoffs. We have provided such a
proof for tradeoffs among non-trivial modeling desiderata. We also believe
that the definitions and techniques described in this paper can be used to
demonstrate the existence of a number of other tradeoffs among proper-
ties such as simplicity, representational capacity, and accuracy, as well as
precision and generality.
The particular case of tradeoffs between precision and generality we dis-
cussed are also important for scientific methodology, as they are connected
to some of the interests and goals employed by modelers studying complex
systems. In particular, generality has been alleged to be a key ingredient in
scientific explanations and to help capture trends among similar, but distinct
phenomena.
Generality features prominently in many philosophical theories of sci-
entific explanation, and in some accounts, generality is considered to be
the core of a scientific theory’s explanatory power. Unificationists correlate
explanatory power of a theory with the number of phenomena that it can
subsume (i.e., its a-generality), modulo other constraints (Kitcher, 1981,
1989; Friedman, 1974). More recent causal accounts (e.g., Strevens, 2004;
Woodward, 2003) rely on a notion akin to p-generality to find the optimal
causal explanation of a particular event.
The value of generality for explanation has also been defended by scien-
tists, notably population biologists. These scientists point to the especially
high value of general models in allowing theorists to explain similar phe-
nomena using the same framework in order to reveal underlying patterns
among these phenomena (e.g., Roughgarden, 1979, 1997; May, 2001; Nowak
& May, 2000). Increasing the generality of a set of models, perhaps by low-
ering precision, lets theorists treat these systems in a common framework.
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In so doing, theorists may have a greater ability to determine the underlying
features common to these systems, features which may be responsible for
understanding patterns of interest.
These accounts all suggest that increases in generality are, ceteris paribus,
associated with an increase in explanatory power. The existence of trade-
offs between precision and generality indicates that one way to increase an
explanatorily valuable desiderata is by sacrificing precision. Conversely, in-
creasing precision may lead to a decrease in explanatory power via its effect
on generality.
Whether a particular instance of this tradeoff does in fact limit explana-
tory power will, of course, depend on the circumstances under which preci-
sion is altered. Arbitrarily altering generality by way of altering precision
will not thereby necessarily increase or decrease explanatory power, as this
depends on other factors as well. Similarly, at a certain point, a model can
become so general that it says nothing of interest regarding its targets and
thereby loses explanatory power. However, there are circumstances where it
would be rational for theorists to sacrifice some precision to gain generality
and hence explanatory power.
Therefore, if an increase in either explanatory power or descriptive breadth
are of importance to the modeler, whenever they are faced with a hetero-
geneous set of targets they must make a choice. One way to achieve the
desired levels of generality is to make the equations used to describe the
model less precise than would otherwise be optimal. Alternatively, the way
in which the model is compared with its targets may be altered, by limiting
the intended scope or fidelity criteria employed by the modeler.
More broadly, this discussion gives us further reason to follow Levins in
seeing the analysis of tradeoffs as crucial to understanding scientific method-
ology. An appreciation of what kinds of tradeoffs can occur and the cir-
cumstances in which they arise will aid philosophers in understanding the
patterns of models used in the different branches of science.
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